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Abstract: The impact of the investment in absorptive capacity on transboundary 
pollution is studied by considering two countries each of them regulating a firm. 
Firms can invest in original research and in absorptive research to lower their 
pollution intensity. The absorptive research enables a firm to capture part of the 
original research made by the other one. We show that by means of adequate 
emission taxes, original and absorptive R&D subsidies, non-cooperating regulators 
can reach the social optimum. Interestingly, we show that the investment in 
absorptive research enables non-cooperating regulators to better internalize 
transboundary pollution. The higher is the ability parameter of absorption, the 
greater is the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized.  Therefore, it is 
recommended for the international community to make the patent laws more flexible 
and enabling learning from the research made by others more interesting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ozone layer depletion and global warming are examples of damages 
engendered by tranfrontier pollution and are caused by the total emissions of gazes 
such as the carbon dioxide. Transboundary pollution is therefore a negative 
externality among countries which usually does not lead non-cooperating countries 
to the Pareto-optimality. Nevertheless, some authors showed that non-cooperating 
governments can reach the first best under some conditions (Hoel (1997), Zagonari 
(1998)). By developing a static two-country, two-good general equilibrium model, 
Takarada (2005) investigated the welfare effects of the transfer of pollution 
abatement technology when cross-border pollution exists. He derived and 
interpreted the conditions under which technology transfer enriches the donor and 
the recipient. While the tax competition literature showed that tax rates are set too 
low in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with respect to the cooperative one, 
Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) showed that international spillovers from public 
goods reduce tax competition. Ben Youssef (2009) showed that R&D spillovers and 
the competition of firms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to 
better internalize transfrontier pollution. 
Our paper differs from the existing literature by the fact that we study transborder 
pollution using a model where firms can invest in absorptive research to capture part 
of the original research developed by others. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the first to introduce the idea of absorptive 
capacity in the (process or cost reduction) R&D literature. Contrary to the result in 
the seminal paper by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) where R&D 
spillovers are assumed exogenous and cost free, Cohen and Levinthal showed that 
intra-industry spillovers may encourage R&D investment. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) 
analyzed a simple non-tournament model of R&D where firms engage to reduce 
their cost of innovation. She showed that, when spillovers of information are 
endogenized, non-cooperative firms never disclose any of their information, whereas 
they will always fully share their information when they cooperate in R&D. Kamien 
and Zang (2000) modeled a firm’s effective R&D level that reflects how both its R&D 
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approach (firm specific or general) and R&D level influence its absorptive capacity. 
Leahy and Neary (2007) specified a general model of the absorptive capacity process 
and showed that costly absorption raises the effectiveness of own R&D and lowers 
the effective spillover coefficient thus weakening the case for encouraging research 
joint venture (RJV) even if there is complete information sharing between firms. 
Milliou (2009) showed that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in 
R&D investments. Hammerschmidt (2006) considered a two-stage game in which 
R&D plays a dual role: First, it generates new knowledge and second, it develops a 
firm’s absorptive capacity. She found that firms will invest more in R&D to 
strengthen absorptive capacity when the spillover parameter is higher. 
Ben Youssef and Zaccour (2009) considered a duopoly competing in quantities and 
where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. They distinguished 
between effort carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (original R&D) and effort 
to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the knowledge 
developed by rival. There are also free R&D spillovers between firms. They showed 
that a regulator can reach the social optimal outcome by implementing a taxation 
and subsidy policy. The regulator subsidizes at a higher rate original R&D effort than 
its absorptive capacity counterpart when the free spillovers are high, and the 
contrary may occur when the free spillovers are low. When the cost of original 
research is lower than the one of absorptive research, or when the learning parameter 
of the latter is low, then the socially optimal level of original research is higher than 
the one of absorptive capacity. The opposite result holds when the cost of absorptive 
capacity is lower than the one of original research and when the learning parameter 
is high.  
We consider a three-stage game consisting of two identical regulator-firm 
hierarchies. Each firm produces, while polluting, one good sold on the domestic 
market. Firms invest in original research which directly reduces their 
emissions/output ratios. They also invest in absorptive research enabling a firm to 
benefit from the original research made by the other one. Part of the pollution of firm 
i is exported to country j. Since each firm constitutes a monopoly polluting the 
environment, it is regulated. In the first stage, each regulator non-cooperatively 
 4 
announces a tax per-unit of pollution to induce the socially optimal level of pollution 
and production, a subsidy per-unit of original research to induce the socially optimal 
level of original research, and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive research to induce the 
socially optimal level of absorptive capacity. In the second stage, each firm invests in 
R&D and in the third one they offer their production on the domestic market. 
Interestingly, we show that the investment in absorptive research enables non-
cooperating regulators to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher is 
the ability of absorption, the greater is the proportion of transboundary pollution 
internalized. This constitutes an important result of this paper which is due to the 
second stage of investment in research. Indeed, transboundary pollution has been 
mostly studied by static models which showed that transboundary pollution is 
completely not internalized by non-cooperating countries when the damage function, 
as in our model, is separable with respect to the pollution remaining at home and the 
one received from other countries (Mansouri and Ben Youssef (2000)). Nevertheless, 
Ben Youssef (2009) showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of firms on the 
common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary 
pollution.  
We also prove that non-cooperating regulators can reach the social optimum by 
means of the three regulatory instruments defined above. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, in Section 3 we 
characterize the socially optimal production and R&D levels, in Section 4 we derive 
the socially optimal regulatory instruments, and in Section 5 we conclude. An 
appendix contains some proofs. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two firms. Firm i 
located in country i is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity qi  sold 
in the domestic market having the following inverse demand 
function p a q ai i= − >2 0, .  One reason for the market structure we use is that the 
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markets of the industries that engage in large investments in R&D are usually 
oligopolistic. Also, we suppose that markets are separated for simplicity. 
The production process generates pollution and firms can invest in R&D in order 
to lower their fixed emission/output ratio. We distinguish between original research, 
denoted by oix , which directly reduces the emission ratio and costs 0,)( 2 >oàio kxk , 
and absorptive research, denoted by aix , which enables a firm to capture part of the 
original research made by the other firm and costs .0,)( 2 >aaia kxk  For simplicity, we 
suppose that there is no free R&D spillovers between firms. 
The effective R&D level of firm i is: 
o
j
a
i
o
ii xlxxx +=  
Where l>0 is a learning or absorptive parameter. 
By normalizing the emission per-unit of production to one without innovation, the 
emission/output ratio of firm i is:  
o
j
a
i
o
ii xlxxe −−=1  
Therefore, the pollution of firm i is i
o
j
a
i
o
ii qxlxxE )1( −−= . 
Since firm i is a regional monopoly that pollutes the domestic environment, it is 
regulated. Each regulator behaves non-cooperatively and maximizes his own social 
welfare function by using three instruments:1 an emission-tax per-unit of pollution it  
to induce the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of production and pollution, a 
subsidy per-unit of original R&D level oir  and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive R&D 
level air  to induce the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of effective R&D and 
emission/output ratio. Therefore, each regulator chooses the non-cooperative 
socially optimal per-unit emission-tax and per-unit R&D subsidies in the first stage 
given the reaction of his firm which chooses its optimal levels of R&D and 
production in the second and third stages, respectively. Thus, by backward 
                                                          
1 These three instruments are necessary in this model. Indeed, even if the non-cooperative socially 
optimal level of pollution can be implemented by only one instrument, such as pollution permits, there 
is no incentive for firms to implement the socially optimal levels of production and R&D. Thus, the 
non-cooperative optimal social welfare level can not be realized. 
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calculations up to the beginning of the game, we determine the three-stage subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
If we denote the marginal cost of production by θ>0, the profit of firm i is 
22)( aiaoioiiiii xkxkqqqp −−−=Π θ , and its profit net of taxes and subsidies is 
a
i
a
i
o
i
o
iiiii xrxrEtV ++−Π= . 
There are also negative externalities between countries through transborder 
pollution. Damages caused to country i are jii EED γα += , where α>0 is the marginal 
damage of the domestic pollution, and γ>0 is the marginal damage of the foreign 
pollution. Notice that even when α and γ are different, the model still remains 
symmetric because these parameters are the same for the two countries. This damage 
function can explain a pure transfrontier pollution problem when α=d(1-c) and γ=dc, 
where 0<c<1 is the proportion of pollution of firm j exported to country i. It can also 
explain an international environmental problem, when α=γ, because damages in one 
country become a function of total pollution.  
 The consumer surplus in country i engendered by the consumption of qi  is 
2
0
)()( iiii
iq
ii qqqpduupCS =−= ∫ . 
The social welfare of a country is equal to the consumer surplus, minus damages 
and subsidies, plus taxes and the net profit of the domestic firm, and is equal, after 
simplifications, to:  
iii
a
j
o
j
a
i
o
ijii DCSxxxxqqS Π+−=),,,,,(                                         (1)       
Notice that taxes and subsidies do not appear in the social welfare function 
because the tax diminished from the firm’s profit is added to the consumer welfare, 
and the subsidies added to the firm’s profit are diminished from the consumer 
welfare.  
 
3. The non-cooperative socially optimal production and R&D levels 
 
Each regulator maximizes, respectively in the third and second stages, his social 
welfare with respect to the production quantity and the R&D levels.  
Expression (1) can be written as: 
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 222 )2()1()1( aiaoioiiijoiajojiojaioiii xkxkqqqaqxlxxqxlxxqS −−−−+−−−−−−= θγα   (2)  
Expression (2) shows that when regulator i chooses his optimal production level in 
the third stage, then transboundary pollution is completely not internalized since the 
parameter γ disappears. This is general for static models with a damage function 
linear with respect to the total pollution, or a separable one with respect to the 
pollution remaining at home and the one received from other countries.2However, 
when he chooses his optimal level of original research in the second stage, then 
transboundary pollution is partially internalized when the learning parameter is non 
nil (l≠0).  The higher the absorptive parameter is, the greater proportion of the 
negative externality is internalized.  
Part of this transboundary externality is internalized when a country chooses its 
level of original research because such a choice, in the case of a positive learning 
parameter, affects the emission ratio and, therefore, the pollution of the firm of the 
other country, which, in turn, affects the foreign pollution received. 
The first order condition of the regulator i third stage is: 0=
i
i
q
S
∂
∂
                           (3) 
The resolution of (3) gives: 
2
)1(
ˆ
o
j
a
i
o
i
i
xlxxa
q
−−−−
=
αθ
                                             (4) 
The symmetric expression of (4) is:                     
2
)1(
ˆ
o
i
a
i
i
xlxa
q
++−−
=
ααθ
                                              (5) 
A sufficient condition for production quantities to be positive is: 
αθ >−a                                                         (6) 
The first order conditions of regulator’s i second stage are:3  
0
ˆˆ
=++=
o
i
i
j
i
o
i
j
i
i
o
i
i
o
i
i
x
S
q
S
x
q
q
S
x
q
dx
dS
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
                                     (7) 
0
ˆˆ
=++=
a
i
i
j
i
a
i
j
i
i
a
i
i
a
i
i
x
S
q
S
x
q
q
S
x
q
dx
dS
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
                                    (8) 
                                                          
2 If damages are not linear, nor separable, then transboundary pollution is partially non-internalized. 
3 The second order conditions are verified in the appendix when ok  and ak  are high enough.  
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At the equilibrium, system (7)-(8) is simplified by using (3), and the symmetric4 
solutions are given by the following equations: 
 
[ ] 04)1(1ˆ)(2 =−+−−+ oiooiaiaiiai xkxlxlxqlx αγγα                        (9) 
02ˆ =− ai
a
i
o
i xkqlxα                                                   (10) 
Using the expression of iqˆ  given by (5), (9) and (10) become: 
[ ] 04)2(1)1())(( =−+−+++− oioaioiaiai xklxxlxlxa γααγαθ                  (11) 
[ ] 04)1( =−++−− aiaoiaioi xkxlxalx ααθα                                  (12) 
The non-linear equations system (11)-(12), confirms the fact that when the learning 
parameter is nil (l=0), transboundary pollution is completely not internalized since γ 
disappears from (11)-(12). The higher l is, the greater proportion of transboundary 
pollution is internalized.  
 
Proposition 1. The investment in absorptive research enables non-cooperating countries to 
better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher is the ability of absorption, the greater 
is the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized.  
 
Solving the non-linear equations system (11)-(12) gives the symmetric socially 
optimal R&D levels denoted by oixˆ  and 
a
ixˆ . Unfortunately, we are not able to get the 
explicit solutions. 
 
Proposition 2. There is a unique solution 0ˆ >oix  and 0ˆ >
a
ix  that solves the non-linear 
equations system given by (11) and (12). 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Conjecture. We conjecture that: 0ˆlimˆlim
,,
==
+∞→+∞→
a
iakok
o
iakok
xx . 
                                                          
4
 We look for the symmetric equilibria because the model is symmetric and computations are easier. 
As it will be explained in the following section, the backward resolution of the game is stopped at the 
second stage. Tha’s why, we have the right to look for the symmetric equilibria at this second stage.    
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This conjecture is logical because when the investment cost parameters are very 
high, it is socially optimal to not invest in R&D. 
 
4. The non-cooperative socially optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies 
 
Given the per-unit emission-tax and the per-unit R&D subsidies announced by the 
regulator in the first stage, the firm reacts by choosing its optimal research and 
production levels in the second and third stages, respectively. By backward 
induction, the firm maximizes in the third stage its net profit with respect to its 
production, then, in the second stage, it maximizes its net profit with respect to its 
R&D levels.  
The first order condition of firm i third stage is: 0=
i
i
q
V
∂
∂
                                        (13) 
The resolution of (13) gives: 
4
)1(
*
o
j
a
i
o
ii
i
xlxxta
q
−−−−
=
θ
                                             (14) 
The symmetric expression of (14) is: 
[ ]
4
)1(1* oiaii
i
xlxta
q
+−−−
=
θ
                                             (15) 
The first order conditions of firm i second stage are:5  
0
*
=+=
o
i
i
i
i
o
i
i
o
i
i
x
V
q
V
x
q
dx
dV
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
                                               (16) 
0
*
=+=
a
i
i
i
i
a
i
i
a
i
i
x
V
q
V
x
q
dx
dV
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
                                               (17) 
At the equilibrium, (16) and (17) are simplified by using (13), and the symmetric 
solutions are given by the following equations system: 
02* =−+ oi
oo
iii xkrqt                                                   (18) 
02* =−+ ai
aa
ii
o
ii xkrqlxt                                                 (19) 
                                                          
5
 The second order conditions are verified in the appendix when ok  and ak  are sufficiently high.  
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Since the emission-tax and the R&D subsidies are set to incite firms to reach the 
socially optimal production and research levels which are iqˆ , 
o
ixˆ  and 
a
ixˆ , then 
equations (15), (18) and (19) give the optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies: 
o
i
a
i
i
i
xxl
qa
t
ˆ)ˆ1(1
ˆ4
+−
−−
=
θ
                                                    (20) 
ii
o
i
oo
i qtxkr ˆˆ2 −=                                                      (21) 
i
o
ii
a
i
aa
i qxltxkr ˆˆˆ2 −=                                                   (22) 
 
Proposition 3. By using the three regulatory instruments which are a per-unit emission tax, 
a per-unit original research subsidy and a per-unit absorptive research subsidy, non-
cooperative regulators can push their firms to implement the socially optimal levels of 
production and R&D. 
 
Let’s notice here that the socially optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies are not 
determined directly by maximizing the social welfare function of the regulator in the 
first stage. They are calculated at the second stage by equalizing the socially optimal 
production and research levels to those optimal for the firm. In fact, the model is 
resolved as if it was a two-stage one.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We develop in this paper a non-cooperative and three-stage game played by two 
regulator-firm hierarchies in presence of transborder pollution and absorptive 
capacity.  
We show that the investment in absorptive research enables non-cooperating 
countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher the learning 
parameter of absorptive capacity is, the higher the proportion of transboundary 
pollution internalized is. Therefore, it is recommended for the international 
community to make the patent laws more flexible and enabling learning from the 
research made by others more interesting. In addition, if countries fully cooperate, 
then transboundary pollution is completely internalized and they reach the first best. 
 11 
Moreover, countries can implement their non-cooperative socially optimal levels of 
production and research by using three regulatory instruments which are the per-
unit emission tax, subsidy of original research and subsidy of absorptive research. 
 
Appendix  
 
A) Second order conditions of the regulators second stage 
 Consider the Hessian matrix: 














=
2
22
2
2
2
a
i
i
a
i
o
i
i
a
i
o
i
i
o
i
i
S
dx
Sd
dxdx
Sd
dxdx
Sd
dx
Sd
H  
 By using the first order conditions given by (7) and (8), we can determine the second 
derivatives constituting matrix SH  which can be written as: 








−
−
=
a
o
S kff
fkf
H
2
2
32
21  
Where if , i=1, 2, 3, are polynomial functions in oix  and aix (symmetric case). 
Since 0ˆlimˆlim
,,
==
+∞→+∞→
a
iakok
o
iakok
xx , then if  take finite values when ok  and ak  tend to 
∞+ .  
Therefore, when ok  and ak  are high enough: 
i) 02
2
<
o
i
i
dx
Sd
 and 02
2
<
a
i
i
dx
Sd
,  
ii) ( )( ) 022det 2231 >−−−= fkfkfH aoS . 
Thus, we have a maximum when ok  and ak  are high enough. 
 
B) Proof of Proposition 2 
From (12), we deduce: 
[ ]
2224 oi
a
o
i
o
ia
i
xlk
xxal
x
α
ααθα
−
+−−
=                                           (23) 
Expression (11) is equivalent to: 
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02)2()4()2()( 222 =+++−+−−+−− aioiaioioiàai xxlxlxxkxala αγγααααθγαθα   (24) 
Using (23) in (24), and then multiplying by ( )22224 oia xlk α− , we get a polynomial 
function of degree 5 in oix : 0)( =oixP . The constant term of P is 2)(16 aka αθα −− >0 
and the coefficient of 5oix  is 
okl 444α− <0. 
We have P(0)>0 and −∞=
+∞→
)(lim oi
o
ix
xP , then )( oixP  admits at least one positive root 
0ˆ >oix . Since we have shown that every critical point is a maximum when 
ok  and ak  
are high enough, then we have a unique solution that solves the equations system 
(11)-(12). Since 0ˆ >oix , from expression (23) and condition (6), we have 0ˆ >
a
ix  when 
ok  and ak  are high enough. 
 
C) Second order conditions of the firms second stage 
Consider the Hessian matrix: 














=
2
22
2
2
2
a
i
i
a
i
o
i
i
a
i
o
i
i
o
i
i
V
dx
Vd
dxdx
vd
dxdx
Vd
dx
Vd
H  
 By using the first order conditions given by (16) and (17), we can determine the 
second derivatives constituting matrix VH  which can be written as: 








−
−
=
a
o
V kgg
gkg
H
2
2
32
21  
Where ig , i=1, 2, 3, are polynomial functions in it  and 
o
ix (symmetric case). 
Since oiakok
xˆlim
, +∞→
 and iakok
t
+∞→,
lim  are finite numbers, then ig  take finite values when 
ok  
and ak  tend to ∞+ .  
Therefore, when ok  and ak  are sufficiently high: 
i) 02
2
<
o
i
i
dx
Vd
 and 02
2
<
a
i
i
dx
Vd
,  
ii) ( )( ) 022det 2231 >−−−= gkgkgH aoV . 
Thus, we have a maximum when ok  and ak  are high enough. 
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